Happy Constitution Day
Today is Constitution Day, and unlike the 4th of July, federal employees are at work and law students are in school...some holiday. Despite the Federal Government's refusal to celebrate it's own birth on the appropriate day, Columbia University is presenting a special exhibit of manuscripts from its John Jay collection, which will be displayed in the Rare Book and Manuscript Library on the 6th floor East of Butler Library.
The law school is also throwing a bit of a "celebration," in true law school fashion: pontification. From 4:30-6 p.m. in Jerome Greene Hall, Room 103, Columbia's constitutional law scholars will be holding a roundtable discussion on the Constitution, featuring Professors Kendall Thomas, Sarah Cleveland, Katherine Franke, Philip Hamburger, Suzanne Goldberg, and Jack Greenberg, with Dean Ellen Chapnick moderating.
The law school is also throwing a bit of a "celebration," in true law school fashion: pontification. From 4:30-6 p.m. in Jerome Greene Hall, Room 103, Columbia's constitutional law scholars will be holding a roundtable discussion on the Constitution, featuring Professors Kendall Thomas, Sarah Cleveland, Katherine Franke, Philip Hamburger, Suzanne Goldberg, and Jack Greenberg, with Dean Ellen Chapnick moderating.
1 Comments:
PG
Thanks for visiting us at the Opine Editorials
Since you seem to be writing a paper on the subject I thought I would make you aware of the recent Maryland decision concerning the claim that marriage is a violation of equal protection claims and sex discrimination under the constitution.
I. Claim of Sex-based Discrimination Under Article 46 of the Declaration of Rights
“Appellees assert that, because Family Law § 2-201 excludes same-sex couples from
marriage, the statute draws an impermissible classification on the basis of sex, in violation 13If Family Law § 2-201 discriminates o n the basis o f sex, as the Appellees ass ert, this Court would examine the statute with th e strictest of scrutiny.. To the contrary, the Majority recognizes that strict scrutiny should be applied when the ERA is implicated. But in order for strict scrutiny to be the approach standard, it must first be found that the statute discriminate s on the basis of sex. W e conclude that it does not.10 of Article 4 6 of the ERA. Specifically, Appellees reason that “[a] man who seeks to marry a woman can marry, but a woman who seeks to marry a woman cannot. Similarly, a woman who seeks to marry a m an can marry, but a man who seeks to marry a man cannot.” Thus, because Family Law § 2-201 allows opposite-sex couples to marry but, at the same time, necessarily prohibits same-sex couples from doing so, the statute “makes sex a factor in the enjoyment and the determination of one’s right to marry,” and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.13”
Appellees’ argument, at first glance, is beguiling.
(page 9 -10)
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