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Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Cutter, Accommodation, and Separation of Powers

Cutter v. Wilkinson came down today. 9-0, Ginsburg writing with Thomas concurring to explain that even the historical understanding of the establishment clause as a federalism limit does not make RLUIPA unconstitutional.

This opinion, particularly it being unanimous, is important for a couple reasons. It clarifies the area between what is protected by the Free Exercise Clause and what is barred by the Establishment Clause, specifically finding that RLUIPA is a valid form of accommodation. And secondly, it vindicates Boerne as a case about formal separation of powers, and not about judicial greediness in the definition of rights.

Amos made the point that "[a]t some point, accommodation may devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion." Accommodation of religion by the government entails giving it money, giving privileges. At some point, Amos assumes, accommodation of religion not mandated by the First Amendment runs up against the Establishment Clause. This was the claim made by Ohio--the burdens placed on the state prison system had the effect of impermissibly advancing religion.

But when pressed at oral arguments by Justice Souter, the Solicitor General for Ohio could not articulate where "accommodation" would be permissible if RLUIPA were held to violate the establishment clause. Justice Souter assumed, and Ohio did not contest, that there must be some room for accommodation, and the question was whether the space between the two clauses was so tight as to bar a statute that just places some burdens for protection of all religious exercise. Justice Ginsburg's opinion describes RLUIPA as fitting in this gap.

It's hard to see why RLUIPA would not fit. It does impose burdens on the states, but these burdens do not distinguish based on particular religions, as is evident from the beliefs of the plaintiffs (the Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru religions, and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian). If RLUIPA establishes religion, then we're on a slippery slope to doing away with tax exemptions and any legislation that protects all religious exercise. This would close the gap, making the Free Exercise the only possible form of protection, since Congress' role would be gone.

The second reason I think the opinion is important is that there is no discussion of the separation of powers issues that there were in RFRA. The Court has been criticized by civil rights and religious rights advocates as being greedy with its protecting of rights, and using separation of powers in the Boerne line of cases pretextually.

But Justice Ginsburg's opinion does not even take up the issue, and it was barely discussed at arguments. As I previously noted, and as argued in an amicus brief by Marty Lederman on behalf of Senators Hatch and Kennedy, the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause attacks on the statute were weak, and there was no reason to view this case in light of Boerne. Boerne was true formalism, was not a pretext for a judicial power grab in the definition of rights. Boerne held, and Cutter confirms, that Congress can participate in the protection of freedoms; it need only play by the rules.

ALSO: Marty Ledermann at SCOTUSBlog has this discussion.

Continue Reading "Cutter, Accommodation, and Separation of Powers" . . .

A lot of good it does them now...

The Supreme Court unanimously overturned Arthur Andersen's obstruction of justice conviction this morning. The decision, which came down quickly, was widely expected after the drubbing the Government received across the board during oral arguments. The main legal fault was found in the jury instructions, which were overly broad, and virtually assured conviction. The trial court amended the jury instructions to allow conviction for simply impeding an investigation but the Supreme Court disagreed, in effect requiring some knowing interference with, as opposed to just "impeding" an investigation. Here, the mens rea element could not be shown when all the jury needed to find was any impediment, conscious or not. Now, while it is clear that the reversal does not necessarily mean that AA was innocent of obstruction, it is unfortunate that such a clearly flawed legal standard, one requiring virtually no consciousness of wrongdoing at all, was the means used to convict. Since AA had to surrender their license based on this conviction, their 28,000 employees were forced to search for new work, and their reputation went down the toilet, the company is no more. A legal victory, and perhaps an important point of clarification for companies facing future investigations, but a hollow victory indeed for Arthur Andersen. See Also ScotusBlog.

Continue Reading "A lot of good it does them now..." . . .

Thursday, May 26, 2005

Rosen Colored Glasses...

What color is the sky in your world? This is a question increasingly worth asking of Jeffrey Rosen, whose work I've admired over the years in the New Republic, but whose latest efforts show less and less of the independent thinker and more and more of the conventional media liberal. [UPDATE: Will Baude, over at Crescat, notes that Rosen has taken an unconventional view on Roe over the years. It is true that at TNR he has suggested that if Roe were overturned, comity might return to the judiciary; it is also true that he has criticized Roe on the merits. This is the independence I had in mind, and what I find lacking in pieces like the one I discuss here.] Randy Barnett and the Volokh gang have done a nice job of debunking his recent effort (a longer version of an earlier argument he had ventured in TNR) to keep the dubious "Constitution in Exile" meme alive in the NYTimes Magazine.

This week, in the New Republic (sorry, I think you need a subscription to access the story), Rosen offers further glimpses of his worldview, in a way that is illuminating. The piece fits comfortably into the general "sky is falling" narrative that has possessed Upper West Side folks, the Times Op Ed Page, Andrew Sullivan, and diverse others since the last election. Here the subtitle is "GOP v. Judiciary." How original. It's sort of sad that even with the chance to reflect on his wisdom upon his passing, so few liberals realize that Lloyd Cutler was right about the damage that Democrats would do to the judicial nomination process (and arguably the judiciary itself) when they shamefully pretended that Robert Bork was against civil rights, dishwashers, breathing, and other assorted goods. How far they have come now to assert that Janice Rogers Brown does not appreciate the plight of minorities--perhaps some time with White Senate Millionaire Harry Reid would help her to glean those insights she missed in her youth.

But back to Rosen. Let's just sample some of his argument, the heart of which appears to be that the GOP invented the filibuster and destroyed our Constitutional order:

But far more significant than these political flip-flops is the fact that the House and Senate are no longer reliable representatives of most Americans' constitutional views. This is a dramatic and important shift. For most of U.S. history, all of the great constitutional issues--from the meaning of free speech to the meaning of equality--were debated in the House and Senate, which reflected the views of democratic majorities more precisely than the president or the courts. But, as political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue in their forthcoming book, Off Center: George W. Bush, Tax Cuts, and the Erosion of Democracy, recent changes have made Congress an unreliable representative of majority will. Now that incumbents, thanks to partisan gerrymandering, are virtually assured reelection, politicians have a strong incentive to pander to their most reliable supporters--including partisan activists and high-stakes donors--in order to avoid the primary challenges that now decide elections. This means that representatives and senators can increasingly ignore the preferences of the moderate majority without suffering electoral consequences.

Gosh, when I learned about gerrymandering in 8th grade history way back in the 80s, when Democrats ran the Congress, my teacher was so prescient! How could he know that some day way in the future, Republicans would invent a way to keep incumbents in office...but, wait, I know Gerrymandering has a more venerable history than that...Surely Rosen can't expect anyone to take this seriously.

But of course it gets worse. We learn early in the article that "Polls show that more than two-thirds of Americans oppose eliminating the filibuster." (I presume he's quoting the absurd WaPo poll which asked people whether they favored "changing the rules so Republicans can more easily confirm Pres. Bush's nominees"--no leading question there.) We also learn that 2/3 of people polled didn't like the Schiavo intervention. But then we also learn: "if Congress no longer accurately represents the constitutional views of the majority, the Court will have alarmingly little evidence of what those views are, aside from fickle public opinion polls." The incoherence of this piece is somewhat dizzying. Of course, even though courts are not good at determining public opinion, courts turn out to be good at determining public opinion:

Fortunately, the canniness of the courts in following public opinion suggests that Republican attacks on judicial independence are unlikely to succeed...history suggests that the Court tended to retreat in the face of congressional opposition only when it was genuinely out of step with public opinion. That is not the case today. If the historical pattern holds, the courts are unlikely to wilt before congressional proposals to strip them of jurisdiction over controversial cases...As long as judges are confident that a majority of the country is behind them, they will remain steadfast in the face of congressional bullying.

Let's clear some of its errors away: Gerrymandering, while a problem and something I oppose, is centuries old. There is little reason to believe that it is worse now than during the 40-odd years of uninterrupted Democrat rule in the House; but infinite rule by Democrats wouldn't seem odd to some. Further, while Clinton nominees Steve Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg sailed through the GOP-controlled Senate, Democrats now claim that a black woman from the South does not understand the plight of minorities. Does anyone think they would vote unanimously for Scalia today, though they did when he took the court? Scalia has not changed, the Democrat party has changed, in that it has adopted an utterly politicized view of the judiciary. Are Chuck Schumer and Ted Kennedy really more representative of "mainstream views" than President Bush? Care to run that in an election? (Contrast Schumer's approach to selecting judges with Lloyd Cutler's here.)

But worse than the sloppy history and incoherent political analysis is the similarly indefensible presumption that most of the country agrees with Jeff Rosen and Sandra Day O'Connor on the issues of the day:

Unlike the Republican base, however, a majority of the American people agree with the Supreme Court on most important issues. In the 1980s and 1990s, as conservatives passed tax cuts and scaled back the size of government, the Court modestly followed their lead, striking down laws on the margins of the post-New Deal regulatory state, such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. And, as the public sided with liberals in the culture wars--endorsing gay rights, affirmative action, and access to early-term abortions--so did the Court.

Presumably fickle polling establishes the central basis of Rosen's claims. Unlike the fickle poll we had last November, where one candidate, campaigning on his record of judicial appointments and his ongoing promise to appoint more Scalias and Thomases to the Supremes, won a clear majority. Oh, and nevermind that the court has done much more than endorse "early-term abortions," that there is scant evidence that the public has robustly endorsed gay rights (let alone the logic of Lawrence, which imagines that founders embraced them, too), and mixed evidence of public support for affirmative action (even if you believe in polls, as Rosen does not).

So, to sum up, in Rosen's world, the following things are all true, all at once: The Supreme Court should not try to follow public opinion, because it is not equipped to; historically, the Supreme Court has done a nice job of following public opinion; Gerrymandering is a new phenomenon that newly threatens the country; the court was following public opinion in Roe and its progeny, not leading; and Janice Rogers Brown is a "radical." What color is that sky again?

Continue Reading "Rosen Colored Glasses..." . . .

Wednesday, May 25, 2005

Nuclear Politics

The great irony of the discussion over the constitutionality of the Senate procedures for closing debate and for amending rules has been the liberals' insistence that a practice must be constitutional since it is traditional. This will surely ease their objections to future conservative judicial nominees, whose "extreme" behavior is usually showcased by their fidelity to traditions of legality and illegality.

I think there are good arguments to be made for why a majority vote of the Senate should not be the process by which we find a rule (or procedure for setting rules) constitutional or unconstitutional. Personally, I think the weight of the reasoning cuts the other way, since there has to be some method to judge the constitutionality of Senate procedures. The Courts have said they will not get involved in any but grotesque procedural situations (See U.S. v. Nixon), but they have also not precluded others from making constitutional decisions. In fact, the logic of Marbury, by which the Court finds its need to assess constitutionality as incidental to live cases, would support (I believe) a role for the Senate itself in judging the constitutionality of its own procedures. Roberts Rules of Order are not the Supreme Law of the Land; only the Constitution demands such perfect adherence.

But beyond that difficult argument, the most fascinating liberal claim has been that somehow the Republicans were out of line for trying to sabotage an institution which by different accounts has existed since Wilson administration, the Civil War, the Founding of the Republic, and the Seven Days of Creation (to be referenced for hyperbole's sake on the condition that they are never mentioned in a classroom). How Delightful! Precilla Owen is opposed because she is so extreme that she thinks the constitutional tradition of not recognizing unlimited personal rights under the Fourteenth Amendment has some salience. But the same attacked-reasoning used by conservatives from Justice Scalia to Embattled Federalist Law Students to interpret the constitution is inscribed on the Filibuster Golem to preserve its life. What a wonderful trick!

The battle between Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy in Lawrence v. Texas is a rematch of the debate in Michael H. v. Gerald D., which is itself just another chapter in the long line of cases dating back to the Slaughterhouse Cases. If written constitutions are to retain the power we want them to retain, they must be static instruments to bind us from moving too far with majoritarian processes which can be overly susceptible to dynamic and transient impulses. To know the limit of this bind, then, we turn to tradition, since the bind itself is static and not dynamic (that being its only advantage over the otherwise highly legitimate output of democratic majoritarian politics). To understand the limits on the powers of our elected officials, then, we turn in part to history and tradition to see what has been history's understanding of the limits to our legislative powers.

The liberals misunderstand this principle on two fronts now. First, they seek to apply it to Senate rules, whereas it only makes sense in the context of written constitutions. We may have many tax traditions also, but that doesn't mean that attempts to change our tax brackets should be treated with any less deference than the initial creation of tax rates. More critically, though, their conception of rights, and liberties, and freedoms is too dynamic. They see the Constitution as the source of power for mini-legislatures, staffed only with the elite. Its traditions are irrelevant, since it is merely a medium for power for their designated leadership. (This is the Mike "Czar of the Telestrator" Fratello School of Constitutional Jurisprudence. If you have a bad or outmatched team, you try and shorten the game, expecting a greater likelihood of victory in a 30 possession basketball game than in one with 75 possessions. Thus, the liberals---having been convinced that they cannot win in most states or most Congressional districts or most presidential elections---seek to shorten the game by deciding critical matters of society, culture, and law in a nine-person forum). Therefore, they not only don't value traditional interpretations, they need to affirmatively reject them so as to capture power.

But, at least their endorsement of tradition in the battle to preserve a Senate Procedural maneuver must clear the way for future Supreme Court nominees who similarly value looking to our legal traditions to guide our legal present. It must, right?

Continue Reading "Nuclear Politics" . . .

Medellin and Garamendi

With the Supreme Court DIGging, (Denied as Improvidently Granted) Medellin, the big question is what the power of the President is to issue an order compelling Texas to give Jose Medellin his rights to contact his consulate under the Vienna Convention. In the opinions (a per curiam, a concurrence by J. Ginsburg, and dissents by J.'s O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer) issued on Monday, no Justice discussed whether the President had this power, but sent the case down because of newly complicated issues, and because Mr. Medellin may be able to get his relief in state courts.

But Texas has been clear that they don't think the President's order is valid, and that they are not going to comply. So, can the President compel the state?

A relevant case is last term's American Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi. There, The Supreme Court, 5-4, struck down a California law as preempted that conflicted with a Presidential policy regarding the paying of insurance policies confiscated by Nazi Germany. Following the war, the German government established a foundation funded with 10 billion deutsch marks to compensate the companies' victims during the Nazi era. California passed a law requiring insurers to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945. Since the California statute interfered with the federal policy, the Supreme Court found it preempted.

At first blush, Medellin looks easy--the President not only has a foreign policy objective, but an actual pronouncement telling Texas exactly what should be done. Preemption of the otherwise-adequate procedure defaul trule looks like an easy call.

But then there's Youngstown (another case with a whole lot of opinions) which held that "The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution." So the question is whether the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations somehow gives the President authority to issue orders to ensure compliance.

The language of Garamendi makes the issue sound not very hard. After stating the obvious that at some point state efforts run into conflict with federal foreign policy and are preempted, Justice Souter writes:
Nor is there any question generally that there is executive authority to decide what that policy should be. Although the source of the President's power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the "executive Power" vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President's "vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations." While Congress holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to act.
Since the President has power to make executive agreements, and these agreements preempt conflicting state law, the President can preempt.

But Medellin is not this easy. The characterization of the memo that President Bush sent to Texas is hard, and Garamendi was 5-4. It's certainly possible that a Justice in the Garamendi majority sees a difference (as I do) between a valid Executive Agreement containing preemptive power and the President issuing an order directing a state to waive a procedural default. But that, to me, is the issue in Medellin Round II.

Continue Reading "Medellin and Garamendi" . . .


On Monday, the Supreme Court decided to dismiss the much-anticipated Medellin case as improvidently granted. The practical effect of this ruling is to allow Medellin's habeus appeal to move forward in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. That motion was made in part because of a memorandum issued by President Bush directing the Texas state courts, in the interest of comity, to provide review and reconsideration of Medellin's sentence pursuant to the Vienna Protocol. Since the possibility of obtaining actual relief in this setting is great, given the Presidential directive, the Court obviously believed it unneccessary to reach out and decide the questions presented and direct federal habeus relief. Both the majority and concurring opinions made clear, however, that the Court retained jurisdiction to ultimately pass upon these questions and others arising in the case in the future. On its face, the ruling is entirely reasonable: federal habeus is extraordinary relief, relief to which Medellin might not be entitled, and the fact that he is currently pursuing another avenue of relief with a real possibility of giving him what he wants, review and reconsideration, suggests restraint is the best option. Of course, granting that restraint is the best option in deciding the questions granted certiorari in this case, it does not necessarily follow that DIGging the case is the correct solution. Perhaps an easier solution is to simply stay the appeal until Texas state courts decide the ultimate merits of his state habeus petition. That would allow a much quicker resolution of the merits, and wouldn't preclude the inclusion of additional questions presented. Perhaps most significantly, the Court might ultimately have to pass, no matter which way the State proceedings come out, upon the constitutional power of the President to displace state law in the interests of comity, and even more, his ability to direct state courts to give effect to that displacement. Garamendi suggests some independent power of the President in the foreign affairs arena, but could such an amorphous power really reach to directing state courts how to apply procedural rules? This, along with the question everyone wanted to see decided about the effect of the ICJ ruling on Breard and its application to domestic law, will likely form the heart of the case when it ultimately reaches the court again, which given the constitutionally important issues already on the table and the ones likely to arise, we should expect.

Continue Reading "Medellin" . . .

Tuesday, May 24, 2005

Cert for abortion case: Why this one?

A few thoughts about the Ayotte case.

First, I am happy to see the Court granting Cert in an abortion case. The Court has avoided the issue for far too long, given the its divisiveness and also the lack of jurisprudential clarity stemming from Roe and Casey.

But why am I not happy? Because this case is too narrow for the Court to clarify its standard of review without being too activist. The case involves a state law requiring 48 hour parental notification before a woman under 18 can receive an abortion. The law does not have an exception for health emergencies - and the Appeals Court struck it down applying the undue burden standard. This case is very clear to me - any law that does not have an exception for health emergencies places an undue burden on women. Yes - women can still go before a judge to bypass the waiting period - but that could take too long, putting the health of the mother in jeopardy. But that's just my opinion. More importantly...

What this case is really about is whether a law which unduly burdens only a very small fraction of women (those under 18 who face medical emergencies during pregnancy) places an undue burden on a woman's ability to have an abortion. As such, the case invites the Court to determine if the "undue burden" test should be conceived of as a test to be applied to individual cases, or to women as a whole (in the latter case, a situation which falls only on a small portion of women would not constitute an undue burden generally). This is important - no doubt - but I don't see how this case invites resolution of the far more important question - should the undue burden test remain at all, i.e. should a woman's right to an abortion remain constitutionally protected?

And so - I'm happy to see the Court venturing back into this issue - but I am uncertain that this particular case was the right one for the Court to select to illuminate the confused jurisprudence on the subject. If the Court does use this case to revisit abortion laws generally - which I suspect it will - I question how it will manage to do so without overstepping its bounds.

Continue Reading "Cert for abortion case: Why this one?" . . .

Friday, May 13, 2005

Video Killed the LiveBlogging Star

First it was the Waldroon-Yoo debate's webcast that made my transcript superfluous. Now Harvard's posted videos of this year's student symposium.

Continue Reading "Video Killed the LiveBlogging Star" . . .

Tuesday, May 10, 2005

In re Cheney

The DC Courts of Appeals issued a ruling today on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court,124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). People may remember this case as the one which caused significant controversy over the participation of Justice Scalia, who had gone duck-hunting with Vice President Cheney.

In a unanimous ruling written by Judge Randolph, the Court dismissed the claims of the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch that The Energy Task Force headed up by the Veep was subject to the disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Judge Randolph wrote:
In light of the severe separation-of-powers problems in applying FACA on the basis that private parties participated in, or influenced, or were otherwise involved with a committee in the Executive Office of the President, we must construe the statute strictly. We therefore hold that such a committee is composed wholly of federal officials if the President has given no one other than a federal official a vote in or, if the committee acts by consensus, a veto over the committee's decisions.
The Court went on to hold that, because of this interpretation of FACA, the petitioners had failed to make out a case as to why the federal government owed them any duty, let alone a clear and indisputable duty, and as such, a writ of mandamus should not issue.

Continue Reading "In re Cheney" . . .

Monday, May 09, 2005

Where is Paul Clement? 40 under 40

So the National Law Journal just released a list of top 40 lawyers under 40. I was glad to see that our lovely Dean, the youngest Dean at CLS ever, made the list. But the list is missing one extremely important lawyer who is under 40: Paul Clement. Why would NLJ leave him off? Ohh well, back to finals.

Continue Reading "Where is Paul Clement? 40 under 40" . . .

Friday, May 06, 2005


. . . have slowed the posting, and will continue to for at least another week or so. Check back.

Continue Reading "Finals" . . .

Wednesday, May 04, 2005

The Real Problem With Medellin

I know I've said this before. But I was wrong. The real problem with Medellin is that the "exceptionalism" being argued for by the petitioners is different from traditional exceptionalism in the sense the Court has found it in cases like Curtiss-Wright and Missouri v. Holland.

"Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism" is a description of the structural transfer of power from the states and Congress to the federal government and the Executive in foreign affairs. The Court grants deference to the Executive in its interpretation of treaties and in its interpretation of some areas of the Constitution; states rights are not protected as carefully as they are domestically.

This exceptionalism can be said to allow the federal government, and even the President to delegate authority internationally. These treaty interpretation regimes have been around since the 1794 Jay Treaty. If the importance of the non-delegation doctrine is exaggerated domestically (Adrian Vermeule & Eric Posner, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721 (2002)), there is a strong argument that any international constraint on the federal government's power to delegate authority to more easily enter international agreements is also exaggerated.

The problem is that this is not the argument being made by petitioners in Medellin. Their argument is not only that Congress can delegate this power, but that they did delegate it. This, however, does not work. At least not without overruling Marbury v. Madison.

The Court, per Marbury, must pass some form of judgment on the ICJ's interpretation of the treaty. They may, as they did in Chevron, not pass independent judgment, but only police the boundaries of the delegation to ensure that the tribunal is acting within the scope of the delegation. This means that a reasonable interpretation fo the treaty by the ICJ would "bind" the Supreme Court. They would have to completely defer to the interpretation within that scope.

But this, I think, is the best petitioners can do. And since the Vienna Convention not only doesn't include any preemptive power over adequate state grounds in the delegation, but expressly states that adjudication of the convention's rights are to follow the rules of the forum states' courts, the decision by the ICJ to preempt an adequate state procedural default rule is outside the scope of the delegation, and therefore unreasonable.

Finding otherwise would be a new kind of exceptionalism that not only transfers power within the federal government, but transfers power away from the federal government, to the ICJ. Furthermore, if the federal government were unable to, either by failing to include a power in the delegation, or even by expressly excluding it, constrain the scope of its international obligations, every delegation would be a blank check for the foreign tribunal, changeable only by exit from the regime. This is obviously bad--not only for those of us concerned primarily with the preserving the democratic structure of the Constitution, but for the international rule of law as well.

Continue Reading "The Real Problem With Medellin" . . .

Monday, May 02, 2005

Solomon Amendment

The Justices have agreed to review a 3rd circuit ruling holding the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional. More to come...

Continue Reading "Solomon Amendment" . . .

After Midnight, I Turn into a Pump-- Er, Federalist

A weekend of studying constitutional law produced this De Novo post that kind-of sort-of almost-seems to say that... Bork was right about the inkblot?

Clearly I need to sleep. Though Bork himself has shifted position on privacy and the Ninth.
Few people now recall that once upon a time, back in the late 1960s, Robert H. Bork welcomed Griswold as an example of how the "idea of deriving new rights from old is valid and valuable. The construction of new rights can start from existing constitutional guarantees, particularly the first eight amendments, which may properly be taken as specific examples of the general set of natural rights contemplated" by the framers and particularly by the Ninth Amendment (Bork, Robert H. "The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy." Fortune 78 (December 1968): 170).

Continue Reading "After Midnight, I Turn into a Pump-- Er, Federalist" . . .